536 9.9 Black or Smokeless Powders 140 20.0 957 17.5 Other* 101 14.5 2,417 44.4 Flammable Liquids 99 14.2 474 8.7 Dynamites and Water Gels 95 13.6 233 4.3 Photo Flash/Fireworks Powders 84 12.0 815 15.0 C4/TNT 4 0.6 9 0.2 Chemicals N/A N/A N/A N/A Undetermined N/A N/A N/A N/A Total 698 100.0 5,441 100.0 Source: The Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Explosives Incidents System.

Figure S.3a

Deaths Resulting from Types of Fillers Used in Bombing Incidents, 1979 through 1995

Undisplayed Graphic

Source: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Explosives Incidents System.

*Other includes match heads, military explosives (excluding C4/TNT), improvised mixtures, flares, boosters, detonating cord, gases, blasting caps, PETN, RDX, HMTD, model rocket propellant, and smoke grenades.

NOTE:For Table S.3, Figure S.3a, and Figure S.3b, as appropriate, the Other category includes six deaths and 1,042 injuries from the World Trade Center Bombing and the Blasting Agents category includes 168 deaths and 519 injuries from the Oklahoma City Bombing.

Figure S.3b

Injuries Resulting from Types of Fillers Used in Bombing Incidents, 1979 through 1995

Undisplayed Graphic

Source: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Explosive Incidents System.

C. CURRENT ATF STUDY

Given the fact that only limited independent testing of taggants has been done in the United States since the OTA completed its report in 1980, the significant issues identified by the 1980 OTA Report had not been resolved as of April 1996, when the Act was enacted. These issues are similar to the ones that the Act mandates the Department to study before deciding whether to propose regulations requiring taggants.

In the interim the Government of Switzerland mandated the use of taggants in explosives used for blasting purposes, other than those mixed on site. In addition, there has been other progress in the research and development of new identification and detection technologies. The Study Group determined that it was necessary to evaluate the progress of past compatibility and safety studies regarding taggants, study the new technologies that have been developed since that date, and examine the experience of other governments in taggant programs.

The efforts of the Study Group are being paralleled and supplemented by independent studies being conducted by the NAS and the International FertilizerDevelopment Center (IFDC). The conclusions and recommendations of the NAS and the IFDC will be assessed in the Study Groups final report. A brief discussion of these independent studies follows.

C-1. Contract with the National Academy of Sciences

ATF entered into a contract with the NAS on August 28, 1996, to conduct an independent and parallel study of the viability of adding tracer elements to explosives for the purposes of detection and identification; the feasibility and practicability of rendering inert common chemicals used to manufacture explosives; and, the feasibility and practicability of imposing controls on certain precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosive materials.

The NAS study will explore and define methods, materials, and technologies that are available today, as well as in research and development, that might be used to enhance the detectability of concealed explosives, or enhance the traceability of illegal explosives after detonation. In making any recommendations for materials to be included as detection or identification elements, the NAS will consider whether the materials pose a risk to human life or safety or substantially impair the quality and reliability of explosives for their intended lawful use. At least three organizations that are capable of conducting testing to validate the study findings will be identified.

The NAS will also evaluate the utility to law enforcement of detection and identification taggants, to include susceptibility to countermeasures, problems of cross-contamination, and ease of detection or identification, analysis and survivability. Materials recommended for inclusion as detection or identification taggants shall not have a substantial adverse effect on the environment. The study shall include an assessment of costs associated with the addition of tracer elements.

The NAS study will explore and define methods, materials, and technologies in use, or in a research and development phase, that might be utilized to render common explosives chemicals inert or less explosive. The NAS study will also explore the feasibility and practicability of imposing controls on certain precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosive materials.

The NAS was directed to provide ATF with a report of its progress, including a description of where its activities will be directed during the remainder of its study, to coincide with this progress report. The NAS has completed its interim report which was released on May 23, 1997. The NAS final report is to be submitted to ATF no later than 30 days after completion of its study, but not later than February 1998.

C-2. Contract with the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC)

On November 5, 1996, ATF entered into a contract with the IFDC to supplement the portion of the study related to the regulation and use of fertilizers. The Act specifically directs that any portion of the study of the regulation and use of fertilizer as a pre-explosive material shall include consultation and input from nonprofit fertilizer centers.

The IFDC was directed to specifically study and report on the feasibility, practicability, and impact of implementing requirements to render common nitrate-based fertilizer chemicals inert, and imposing controls on precursor chemicals used in nitrate-based fertilizers.

The IFDCs report, including its findings and recommendations, will be included in the final report.

C-3. Establishing of ATF-Industry Partnerships

From the onset, the Study Group members recognized the importance of establishing working partnerships with the respective industries and others who have an interest in the results of the Study. To date, the Study Group is working with the following associations, who are among the many with an interest in this study:

The American Pyrotechnic Association

The Chemical Manufacturers Association

The Fertilizer Institute

The International Society of Explosives Engineers

The Institute of Makers of Explosives

The National Rifle Association

The Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute

As part of ATFs commitment to maintain open lines of communication with these associations and their members, the Study Group has held meetings to discuss the progress of the Study. Additionally, these meetings were intended to provide anopen forum for the associations to present their concerns and share information that may assist ATF in conducting the Study. Letters were also sent to the industry associations requesting any and all information, to include evidence, studies, tests, and other pertinent materials that they possess regarding current and past efforts which may impact the Study. Responses to these letters have been very helpful in conducting the Study.

C-4. Identification of Other Federal and International Efforts

The Study Group has worked to identify, consult with and obtain available information concerning the efforts of other Federal agencies, and international organizations engaged in efforts that have an impact on the issues under study, such as the detection of raw explosives or placing controls on common chemicals for other purposes. Other Federal entities include:

The Department of Defense

The Department of Energy

The Department of Justice

The Department of States Technical Support Working Group

The Drug Enforcement Administration

The Federal Aviation Administration

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The General Accounting Office

The International Civil Aviation Organization

The National Institute of Justice

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

D. TAGGING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

Pursuant to its mandate to study the tagging of explosive materials, the Study Group visited manufacturers of explosive materials and ammonium nitrate (AN);had limited participation in the testing of taggants; consulted with foreign governments and manufacturers concerning their efforts, including tagging, to address the criminal use of explosives; and received proposals on the testing of existing and new taggant technologies.

D-1. Visits to United States Manufacturers

The Study Group visited several manufacturers of explosive materials. On-site briefings, as well as tours of manufacturing plants, are providing invaluable insight into the manufacturing processes, distribution processes (to include importation and exportation), and legal uses of the materials involved. Consequently, the Study Group will be able to reasonably assess the impact of any changes which may be recommended upon completion of the Study.

·390·On December 11, 1996, the Study Group toured ICI Explosives, Joplin, Missouri, which manufactures explosive-grade AN and emulsions.·390

·390·On December 12, 1996, the Study Group met with representatives, and toured the facilities at Dyno Nobel, Carthage, Missouri. Dyno Nobel is the only domestic manufacturer of nitroglycerin dynamites, and also produces emulsions and slurries.·390

·390·On March 26, 1997, the Study Group toured MP Associates, Ione, California, which designs and manufactures pyrotechnic products/special effects for use by the entertainment industry.·390

D-2. Testing Activities

D-2(a). Dipole Might

Given the fact that questions were raised by the 1980 OTA assessment of the pilot tagging program conducted between 1977 and 1979, the Study Group determined to work with ATFs Dipole Might project to conduct preliminary testing of the survivability and retrievability of developed identification taggants placed in explosive materials. The Dipole Might project, initiated in 1990, provided for the first comprehensive, scientific analysis of large scale (50 - 5,000 pounds) vehicle bombs. It is a multi-national endeavor which uses a computer-aided design program to analyze various effects of vehicle bomb blasts.

However, the completion of the portion of the project that relates to AN has been delayed. A court-approved discovery agreement in the Oklahoma City bombing trial restricted ATFs participation in any tests involving more than 50 pounds ofAN in any improvised explosive devices. Compliance with this court-approved agreement has constrained ATF from participating in tests involving more than 50 pounds of AN to determine the survivability and retrievability of taggants in large AN explosions. As a result, the Dipole Might project is approximately 2 years behind schedule regarding AN testing.

Data generated to date from the Dipole Might project has assisted in the designing of the International Terminal at the San Francisco, California, International Airport, as well as assisting in the evaluation of the vulnerability of the construction of a new U.S. Secret Service building and Department of State embassy facilities. The Dipole Might project is extremely important to ensure that Federal and other public buildings are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist bombings in the future.

D-2(b). Israeli Explosives Tests

From October 14-29, 1996, the Study Group traveled to Israel at the invitation of the Israeli Government to observe and participate in a series of explosives tests, utilizing AN, designed to study blast effects on buildings and automobiles. Due to previously mentioned restrictions on testing AN, the explosive material used by the Israelis was switched from AN to trinitrotoluene (TNT) in both cast and flaked form. The Study Group was able to add taggants to two explosive shots to test the possible survivability of the Microtaggant and Isotag (see Glossary). The substitution however, occurred too late to properly add Microtaggant or Isotag taggants to the TNT to establish an intimate mix and the appropriate ratio of taggants to explosives used.

The primary purpose of the exercise was to conduct Israeli and Dipole Might tests. These tests were conducted; however, the Study Group determined that the taggant portions of the exercise were inconclusive because the taggants were not properly mixed and, therefore, it was impossible to determine if they functioned as designed by the manufacturers.

D-3. Consultations with Foreign Governments and Manufacturers

The Study Group has met with foreign law enforcement agencies and military personnel to discuss their efforts to address the criminal use of explosives and explosive materials, as well as their perspectives on the actual or potential utility of identification markers. The Study Group also met with several foreign manufacturers of explosives and explosive materials. Significant fact-finding activities centered around Switzerland, where the tagging of packaged explosive materials used for blasting purposes has been required by law since 1980.

D-3(a). Switzerland

The Swiss Federal Act of Explosives for Civil Purposes, enacted on July 1, 1980, requires that explosive products specifically designed for blasting be tagged. Bulk explosives which are produced and used on-site (the location where they are to be used) are not required to be tagged.

Representatives of the Swiss Federal Polices Scientific Research Service (SRS), who oversee the Swiss explosives tagging program, met with the Study Group from November 12-15, 1996. During this time, the Study Group also met with the following Swiss manufacturers of explosives, and one Swiss producer of metal powders and alloys (which adds a marker to a premix used in the manufacture of explosives), to discuss their perspectives on the use of markers:

Schweizerische Sprengstoff, Isleten, Switzerland, adds the 3M taggant to dynamite and ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO).

The Societe Suisse des Explosifs, Gamsen, Switzerland, uses the ExploTracer taggant (described below) for water gels, ANFO, dynamite, and black powder, and the 3M taggant for sensitized ANFO and plastic explosives.

Swiss Blasting, Bulach, Switzerland, adds the HF-6 taggant (described below) to slurries and ANFO.

Doral Distribution, Sion, Switzerland, prepares a premix for Swiss Blasting to which the HF-6 taggant is added.

Swiss manufacturers currently use one of three identification taggants; the 3M microchip, HF-6 taggant, and ExploTracer taggant. The 3M (known in the U.S. as the Microtaggant) is a color-coded, polymer microchip consisting of ten layers including a magnetic layer and a fluorescent layer. The HF-6 is similar to the 3M and is coded according to its several layers of color. The HF-6 taggant was developed by Swiss Blasting and is used exclusively in its own products. The ExploTracer taggants consist of synthetic granules (dyed with fluorescent pigments), iron particles, and rare earth elements. The ExploTracer taggant has a limited number of codes and is currently exhausting its capabilities for use in Switzerland.

The Swiss produce approximately 6-11 million pounds of tagged explosives each year. The SRS stated that approximately 40 percent of its annual production of tagged explosives consists of dynamite and the remaining 60 percent is other products such as water gels and slurries.

There are four explosives manufacturers in Switzerland, three manufacturers of high explosives and blasting agents and one manufacturer of low explosives (black powder). The three manufacturers of high explosives produce nitroglycerin-based dynamite, slurries, water gels, plastic explosives, safety fuse, and detonating cord.

Plastic explosives are produced in Switzerland in small quantities. Those produced for the Swiss military contain one of the detection marking agents listed in the 1991 Convention on Marking Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. Those produced for civil use, primarily surface rock blasting, contain an identification taggant. The Swiss do no produce or import cast boosters for commercial use.

High density (fertilizer grade) AN is not tagged. All three types of identification taggants are used to tag ANFO (manufactured with low density (explosive grade) AN)).

Manufacturers are required to change the taggant code after 6 months or the production of 300 tons of explosive product, whichever occurs first. Production machinery is not cleaned between taggant code changes. The SRS stated that rather than creating a problem of cross-contamination of taggant codes, this absence of cleaning can enhance the ability to trace explosives to a possible purchaser. If two different taggatns are found at an explosion site, the time period during which the explosives were manufactured can be limited to a short period after the first taggant was discontinued and the second taggant was introduced.

Swiss manufacturers estimated that adding taggants to their explosive products has increased the cost of the explosive products by 4-7 cents per pound, depending on the cost of the taggants. They further stated that the administrative costs associated with tagging explosives are minimal; that they did not have to hire additional personnel; and, that they did not have to refit or retool their manufacturing plants.

Swiss manufacturers are required to buy unused explosives back from purchasers (at a lower rate than the original sale price). The returned explosives must be destroyed by open burning or open detonation, or they can be reworked into the production of a new batch of explosives. However, due to concerns over potential cross-contamination in excess of the SRS-established acceptable 10:1 ratio, a new production batch may only contain 6 percent of a returned product. In order to rework explosives, manufacturers must obtain specific authorization from the SRS, and are required to submit samples of the explosives to be reworked to the SRS. Specific data on the percentage of explosives bought back by Swiss

manufacturers is unavailable. However, the SRS estimates the amount to be less than 1 percent, due to the fact that approximately one request by a manufacturer to rework explosives is received per 5-year period.

According to Swiss authorities, controls on the destruction of explosives in Switzerland are not as restrictive as those imposed in the U.S. because the focus is on safety rather than the environmental effects of destruction by detonation or burning. The SRS believes that if burning were the preferred method of destruction, then environmental effects would become an issue. However, as most explosives are destroyed by detonation, this is not the case.

All purchasers of explosives in Switzerland are required to obtain both a working license (issued at the Federal level) and a purchasers license (issued by the local police). In order to obtain the Federal working license, individuals are required to take a course and pass an examination. In order to apply to take the course, individuals must submit a certificate of reliability, obtained from their local police department, which reflects any criminal convictions or other conditions (such as psychological or substance-abuse problems) which may preclude them from possessing a working license to a Federal commission. This commission, comprised of law enforcement officials and government and commercial explosives experts, approves or denies applications on a case by case basis. Further, if a licensee commits a crime, authorities at the Canton level may revoke his/her license and seize any explosive materials in his/her possession.

There are three types of working licenses, based upon the intended use of the explosives. Purchasing licenses are issued by local law enforcement authorities and are contingent upon inspection of the applicants storage facilities.

Swiss manufacturers are only liable for their products when they are used for their intended purposes.

The Swiss government, Swiss explosive manufacturers, and importers of explosives into Switzerland reported that there has never been an accidental explosion caused by the addition of taggants to explosives. Further, Swiss manufacturers reported that consumers have not complained that taggants have altered the performance of their explosive products.

Swiss law enforcement officials stated that identification taggants have utility in that they provide them with an additional piece of circumstantial evidence. However, according to Swiss officials, between 1984 and 1994, only 22 percent of all explosives used in bombings were found to be tagged. (Both the Study Group and NAS, with whom ATF has contracted, plan to conduct an in-depth analysis of the correlation between taggants and prosecutions.) After 16 years ofusing taggants, 78 percent of explosives used in bombings are untagged. The Swiss explained four likely causes for this--

·390·The explosives used were manufactured before the 1980 tagging law went into effect;·390

·390·Black and smokeless powders manufactured for sporting purposes (which are not required to be tagged) were used; ·390

·390·Military explosives (which are not required to be tagged) were used; or ·390

·390·Explosives from other countries were used. ·390

According to the SRS, the use of pipe bombs containing black and smokeless powders is a significant problem.

D-3(b). Germany

In September 1995, a representative of the German Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), made a presentation at the ATF-hosted explosives symposium concerning an electronic, coded detonator system, which the BKA believes may prove to be an effective deterrent to criminal bombings. As a follow-up to this presentation, from November 18-20, 1996, the Study Group met with officials from the BKA who described their current efforts to address the detection and identification of explosive materials, and other strategies for addressing the criminal use of explosive materials.

The current position of the BKA on the marking of explosives for detection and identification is that significant research is required before a viable program can be identified. Further, they consider the detection of explosives to be more important than post-blast identification. The current focus of the BKA in this area is on air traffic safety. Officials stated that they believe detection equipment such as hand-held scanners, currently in use in airports, to be the best available.

Under the sponsorship of the German BKA, the Study Group met with Dynamit Nobel, the manufacturer of an electronic detonator equipped with a microchip that uses a security code to prevent its unauthorized use. The BKA is studying the possible preventative effect of this system, however, the current cost is approximately $20 per detonator. Although the manufacturer indicated that with mass production this cost would decrease, it is currently considered to be cost-prohibitive for the German market. (In the U.S. market electronic detonators, without security microchips, average $2-3.)

D-3(d). Czech Republic - Detection Taggants

On November 22, 1996, the Study Group met officials at the Research Institute for Industrial Chemistry, Pardubice-Sentin, Czech Republic. The Institute is part of Synthesia which manufacturers high and low explosives including Semtex. Semtex, a plastic explosive, and its derivatives have been marked with vapor detectors in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Treaty of 1991. In 1991, Synthesia used ethylene gylcol dinitrate (EGDN) at 0.2 percent as a detection agent. This was discontinued due to ventilation problems on the production line. Synthesia is currently using para-mononitrotoluene (P-MNT) at 0.5 percent or dimethyl-dinitrobutane (DMNB) at 0.1 percent and has not encountered any problems.

D.4 Proposals for Further Study on Identification and Detection Technologies

The Study Group has worked to identify other viable identification and detection technologies. In addition to technical papers presented at the ATF-hosted International Explosives Symposium in September 1995, ATF has received a significant number of proposals for a variety of technologies. The Study Group is currently identifying experts from the scientific community to conduct independent evaluations of these proposals. Further, copies have been provided to the NAS Committee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Materials.

Proposals have been received to date from the following developers or vendors of detection and identification technologies. Because many of these proposals are proprietary or pending patents, further descriptive information is withheld from this report.

Biocode, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Centrus Plasma Technologies, Incorporated, Denton, Texas

ChemMech, Riverside, California

Dr. G. Vincent Calder, Racine, Wisconsin

Innovative Biosystems, Moscow, Idaho

Isotag, Houston, Texas

The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

Micro Tracers, Incorporated, San Francisco, California

Micro-Dot Security Systems, Incorporated, Missoula, Montana

Microtrace, Minneapolis, Minnesota

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

The Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Security Features, McLean, Virginia

SRI International, Menlo Park, California

Systems Support, Incorporated, Great Falls, Virginia

Tracer Detection Technology Corporation, Syosset, New York

TriValley Research, Medford, Oregon

The University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, Missouri

The U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

West Virginia University Particle Analysis Center, Morgantown, West Virginia

Zia Technologies, New Mexico

D-5. Assessment of Scientific Research and Development Facilities

To date, the following research laboratories have been visited to evaluate their technical expertise and facilities to conduct research, development, and small and large scale testing on those technologies which are assessed as having the greatest potential for successful practical application.

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California

The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

New Mexico Tech, Socorro, New Mexico

The Phillips Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, California

The Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi

The U.S. Department of the Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland

The U.S. Department of the Navy, Indian Head National Laboratory, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, Maryland

E. FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF RENDERING COMMON CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS INERT

The Study Group has consulted with chemical industry associations and manufacturers to assess whether common chemicals can be rendered inert.

For purposes of the Study, a common chemical is defined as a widely used chemical compound or element that, as part of an explosive mixture, acts as a fuel or oxidizer in that mixture. Table S.4 contains examples of common chemicals categorized as fuels or oxidizers.

Table S.4
Chemicals Categorized as Fuels and Oxidizers

Fuels Oxidizers

Aluminum Powder Nitromethane Ammonium Nitrate Barium Peroxide

Charcoal Polyvinylchloride Sodium Nitrate Lead Tetroxide

Diesel Fuel Silicon Iron Oxide Potassium Chlorate

Flour Sugar Lead Dioxide Potassium Perchlorate

Iron Sulfur Ammonium Perchlorate Potassium Nitrate

Magnesium Titanium Barium Nitrate Sodium Perchlorate

E-1. Visit to United States Common Chemical Manufacturer

To establish a useful base of knowledge concerning chemical manufacturing anddistribution processes, as well as the range of common legal uses for the materials involved, the Study Group conducted research and visited a potassium nitrate manufacturing plant.

·390·On February 24, 1997, the Study Group traveled to Vicksburg Chemical, Vicksburg, Mississippi, which produces potassium nitrate.·390

The research conducted to date demonstrates that common chemicals are fundamental to hundreds of industries. For example, potassium nitrate is marketed as a fertilizer and as tree stump remover, and is also used in the manufacture of products such as optical glass. However, potassium nitrate when combined with fuels such as sucrose (sugar) can also be used as an oxidizer in explosive mixtures.

Elemental sulfur, essential to some explosive products, is used in the manufacture of insecticides, dyes, medicines, and in synthetic and natural rubber. Further, many common organic compounds and powdered metals can readily accept oxygen and act as a fuel in an explosive reaction. Other examples of common chemicals essential to the manufacture of some explosive mixtures can be as diverse as sulfur, charcoal, and aluminum powder.

Of the 24 chemicals listed in Table S.4, only sodium perchlorate and potassium perchlorate have limited non-explosive industry uses. For example, potassium perchlorate is used almost exclusively in explosive pyrotechnic mixtures. All of the others are either used in several different industries or are used in a major capacity in a non-explosive industry. For example, nitromethane, a fuel used in binary explosive products, is used extensively as a model airplane fuel. Ammonium perchlorate, used in some pyrotechnic compositions, is the major oxidizer for solid rocket propellants used for space launches, including satellite launches.

E-2. Ammonium Nitrate as a Common Chemical

Explosive industry representatives report that AN is the most widely used common chemical in the manufacture of commercial explosives. A review of incidents in Great Britain and the U.S. indicates that it has also been used in some of the largest bombings worldwide.

E-2(a). Visits to United States Manufacturers

In addition to contracting with the IFDC for their conduct of an independent study, the Study Group has met with individual manufacturers of AN.

·390·On May 22, 1995, members of the Study Group visited the Mississippi Chemical Corporation, Yazoo City, Mississippi, which manufactures several nitrogen-based fertilizers, including AN.·390

·390·From July 8-10, 1996, the Study Group met with representatives of LaRoche Industries, Cherokee, Alabama, which manufactures AN fertilizer.·390

E-2(b). Consultation with Government of Great Britain

The Study Group met with officials from the British Ministry of Defense to discuss their efforts to desensitize AN. Between 1972-1996, all efforts by the British government to render AN less explosive were countered by certain bomb makers. British officials who have focused on the prevention of AN bombs advise that there is currently no known method which is both feasible and cost-effective by which to desensitize AN and render it non-explosive, while maintaining its effectiveness as a fertilizer.

Based on information currently available to the Study Group, rendering common chemicals, including AN, inert would render them ineffective, in most cases, for their intended purposes. Further, to date it appears that certain additives will make AN fertilizer less sensitive to detonation; however, it can still be detonated with a large booster. An assessment of the British experience, a review of the IFDC study, as well as conversations with explosive and chemical industry representatives and government and private sector scientists indicate that it may be more feasible to establish controls on some common chemicals than to attempt to render them inert.

E-3. Proposals for Further Study on Rendering AN Inert

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has initiated work on assessing various alternatives for desensitizing AN. ATF personnel are included in the TSWG interagency group conducting this assessment. The results of the TSWG study will be available to the ATF Study Group as work progresses.

Finally, outside of the scope of the TSWG and the IFDC studies, the Study Group has received proposals concerning methods to render AN inert without impacting on its effectiveness as a fertilizer. Proposals have been received from the following to date:

The Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

Arthur D. Little, Cambridge, Massachusetts

The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, Maryland

Richard Evons, Boise, Idaho

Sparta, Incorporated, El Segundo, California (including the Phillips Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and the University of California at Davis)

The University of Dayton Research Institute, Dayton, Ohio

F. FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF IMPOSING CONTROLS ON CERTAIN PRECURSOR CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

For purposes of the Study, a precursor chemical is defined as any chemical compound or element that can be converted to an explosive compound through a chemical reaction or series of reactions; or a chemical compound or element that can catalyze a reaction in which an explosive compound is synthesized. Table S.5 contains examples of precursor chemicals.

Table S.5
Precursor Chemicals

Acetone Iodine Peroxide

Ammonia Lead Silver

Benzene Mercury Sulfuric Acid

Butane Methane Toluene

Ethylene Glycol Nitric Acid Urea

Glycerin Perchloric Acid

F-1. Visit to United States Manufacturer

To further its understanding of the chemical industry the Study Group visited a manufacturer of specialty chemicals.

·390·On February 28, 1997, the Study Group met with Olin Chemicals, Brandenburg, Kentucky. This facility is the largest Olin plant dedicated to making specialty chemicals. The product line includes hydraulics and brake fluid, ingredients for cleaning products, and chemical products for theelectronic and micro-electronic industries. ·390

Standard chemical references indicate that no precursor chemicals are without non-explosive applications. Further, research indicates that precursor chemicals are fundamental to hundreds of industries and laboratories. For example:

Nitric and sulfuric acids are used to make nitrated organic high explosives such as nitroglycerin, but they are also used by many other industries, such as in laboratories, in extremely pure form, to test other chemicals.

Acetone is a precursor to a highly sensitive primary explosive, yet it is widely used as nail polish remover.

Many organic (carbon-based) molecules can be nitrated and form a compound with explosive properties.

The Study Group has consulted with the chemical industry and other Federal agencies on ways in which access to some of these chemicals might be better controlled. In particular, it has examined a program in which the chemical industry notifies DEA of substantial purchases of specified chemicals used in the illegal manufacture of narcotics.

G. STATE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE AND USE OF COMMERCIAL HIGH EXPLOSIVES

In addition to Federal oversight, manufacturers, dealers, importers, purchasers, and "users" of commercial high explosives are also regulated at the State, county and, in some instances, municipal levels of government, and data has been compiled from these sources. State authorities have supplied the applicable State laws, regulations, codes, statutes, ordinances or legislation, as appropriate. Summary data has also been obtained from the International Society of Explosives Engineers (ISEE), an association representing all facets of the explosives community, and from the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), an association primarily representing explosives manufacturers.

State regulation of the legitimate purchase and use of commercial high explosives relates to several broad categories of industry including mining, quarrying, and construction, as well as to those instances wherein commercial high explosives are obtained for non-commercial uses. Some States have separate requirements for commercial and personal application, some have requirements that apply equally to both, and still others have no requirements at all. A number of State officials contacted by representatives of the Study Group advised that there is a possibilitythat their licensing requirements will soon undergo change.

There is some inconsistency in the explosives regulations of the States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the U.S. For example:

Thirty-seven States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam report that all purchasers must obtain a license or permit to purchase or use commercial high explosives.

Thirteen States report they have no requirement to obtain a license or permit to purchase or use commercial high explosives.

Twenty-four States report the successful completion of training or a test are required to obtain a license or permit to purchase or use commercial high explosives.

H. NEW PREVENTION (DETECTION) TECHNOLOGIES

H-1. Consultation with the Law Enforcement Community

As mandated by law, the Treasury Department contacted the Department of Justice (DOJ) concerning specific new prevention (detection) technologies. DOJ designated an attorney, assigned to its Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, to work with the Study Group. The Study Group has met with the DOJ attorney as well as other representatives from DOJ, the FBI, and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to ensure a collaborative effort between the Secretary and the Attorney General to assess detection technologies.

Published evaluations of detection technologies specified in the Act primarily center on studies related to aviation security. Therefore, information gained is generally in the context of the airport environment. Major publications reviewed by the Study Group include the following:

Detection of Explosives For Commercial Aviation Security, prepared in 1993, for the Federal Aviation Administration, by the Committee on Commercial Aviation Security, National Materials Advisory Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.

Interim Report to the Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center, prepared in April 1996, as a follow-up to its 1993 report, by the NationalMaterials Advisory Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council.

United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics, prepared in September 1996.

A project paper prepared by A.N. Garroway and J.B. Miller, of the Naval Research Laboratory, Chemistry Division, entitled Explosives Detection By Pure N NQR which specifically addressed the use of nuclear quadropole resonance to detect explosives.

In addition, the Department of State has established the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) which has held numerous workshops, of a classified nature, over recent years to identify and report on existing and emerging explosives detection technologies. The TSWG was founded in the 1980s to strengthen U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and improve existing, uncoordinated, unfocused, and inadequate research and development efforts. The TSWG structure was developed to maximize multi-agency input, including ATFs, to identify requirements and prioritize and develop solutions for users. This has become an international effort to provide operationally usable, advanced technology hardware to the counter-terrorism community.

Listed below are the various prevention technologies specifically referred to in the amended Act or otherwise identified by the Study Group.

Vapor/Particle (V/P) detection devices utilize a type of collection system that gathers traces of explosives from a surface or vapors surrounding the target or passenger.

V/P detection devices are non-invasive and able to be used on people. The sample collection step is critical and this technology does not give a direct measure of the amount of explosive present.

The NRC advised the FAA, in its 1996 report, that all detection by trace methods requires further investigation to determine whether or not a threat actually exists. They further advised that a fully functioning system requires integration of sampling, transport, and chemical discrimination. Cost - $60,000- $170,000 per unit depending upon the type of vapor/particle detector utilized.

Computed Tomography (CT) utilizes cross-sectional images integrated by a computer to display density of objects and alarms when characteristics of explosives are detected.

In its 1996 report, the NRC supports CT as the most promising of the x-ray methods. While giving true three-dimensional images, the systems slow speed continues to be a drawback. There are some additional drawbacks, such as the possibility of imaging artifacts, or partial volume effects, that can make it difficult to interpret final data. Cost - $850,000 to $1 million per unit.

Nuclear Quadropole Resonance (NQR) is the examination of nuclei utilizing radio frequency electronics and a computer system. While it is anticipated the equipment could be constructed to detect explosives on a human body, the Technical Support Working Group estimates that this technology could be 2 or more years away.

Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) is the capture of low energy neutrons by nitrogen atoms. The resulting de-excitation produces characteristic gamma-rays. It was initially thought to be valuable to detect large quantities of explosives.

TNA is not applicable for use on people because it uses a radioactive source.

NRC disclosed that TNA machines have a high false alarm rate.

Funding for TNA by the FAA was halted in favor of newer technologies that display a greater likelihood of detecting threat quantities of explosives, particularly explosives concealed in baggage.

Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) utilizes an accelerator to generate neutrons for bombarding a target to measure the induced gamma-rays for the presence of explosives.

PFNA alarms based on three-dimensional images of elemental ratios of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon.

PFNA determines position and depth of suspect material, but early in its development, the NRC noted that shielding was required, the equipment was large, and it could not be used on people.

NRC reported to the FAA that PFNA is a more likely candidate for successthan TNA but advised that any nuclear detection technology should offer substantial advantages over PFNA due to its high hardware, operational, and maintenance costs. Cost - $8 to $10 million.

Electromagnetic Quadropole Resonance refers to a technology under development in which a radio frequency pulse probes packages, bags, or electrical devices to elicit unique responses from explosives. This system automatically alarms when explosives are detected. This technology is commercially available now, in some forms, at approximately $65,000 per unit.

Nuclear Resonance Absorption (NR-A) refers to a technology under development that may be useful for screening cargo containers. NR-A utilizes an accelerator that generates gamma-rays to penetrate screened objects. The gamma-rays are preferentially absorbed by nitrogen nuclei. A significant decrease in the number of detected gamma-rays indicates the presence of a nitrogen-rich material that could be an explosive. An advantage of this technology is that it requires less shielding than other nuclear technologies. Cost estimates are not available.

Pulsed Fast Neutron Radiography is a technology under development that may be applicable for screening cargo containers. This technology uses an accelerator to generate probing fast neutrons and utilizes the measurement of the transmitted neutron spectrum to detect explosives. Cost estimates are not available.

Remote Hand-Held Millimeter Wave Imaging System, according to information provided to the Study Group at a TSWG workshop in March 1996, is a wide-band, active scanning millimeter wave holographic system that forms high resolution images of concealed objects. These systems utilize illuminating energy that readily penetrates clothing. This developing technology will soon be available for field testing. Cost estimates are not available.

The information available to date indicates that there are many threat scenarios that must be addressed and it is unlikely that one detection technology could be developed that would protect all environments. Further, because there are many prevention technologies to evaluate, and eventually fund and develop, a reliable selection process that encourages wide public participation is critical. The U.S. and foreign countries must continue to share needed information, yet control that information to prevent access by terrorists and other criminal elements. The complexity of the issues presents unique problems that will not easily be solved without further study.

H-2. CANINES

In 1990, ATF began a joint program with the DOS, under its Antiterrorism Assistance Program, to train explosives-detecting canines to be used against terrorism overseas. Under this arrangement, ATF trains the canines for the DOS. These canines are used for different mission needs, which include national security and protection, airport security, etc. To date, ATF has trained over 120 explosives detection canines that are deployed in Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, Chile, Italy, and Argentina. ATFs Canine Explosives Detection Program trains canines to detect a wider range of explosives in small concentration. The program has been expanded and additional canines are being trained for State and local law enforcement.

With the limitations of the instrument-based technology for explosive detection, trained canines could supplement, and in some instances, more effectively fulfill many of the missions assigned to machines. A major advantage of canines is their mobility, a significant advantage over fixed detector installations which can be circumvented by a terrorists strategic placement of a bomb.

III. FOCUS OF CONTINUING STUDY

A. TAGGING OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FOR PURPOSES OF IDENTIFICATION AND DETECTION

A-1. Identification Taggants

The utility of identification taggants in helping to produce leads during post-blast investigations of bombings has been clearly demonstrated in the 1979 Baltimore bombing, and potentially through the experience of the Swiss police investigating bombings where taggants were recovered. However, as previously noted, a number of important safety, cost, and environmental issues still need to be resolved.

Reaching definitive conclusions on the appropriateness of including taggants in each type of material that is capable of exploding would be an extremely prolonged task. Although there are literally hundreds of types of explosive materials in the United States, it may not be necessary to review all materials. A review of bombings involving commercial explosives (other than black and smokeless powders) in the United States between 1991 and 1995 reveals that, with few exceptions, they involved only dynamite, slurries, emulsions, or water gels. While dynamite, slurries, emulsions, or water gels are involved in a lesser percentage of overall bombings (2.7 percent or less of incidents which occurred between 1991 and 1995), there have been a number of serious bombings involving those types of explosives in past years. Accordingly, the future work of the Study Group will be focused on these types of explosives. In addition, the Study Group will not examine further the tagging of bulk explosives mixed on-site for immediate use. Law enforcement utility from tagging such explosives is low because there is little risk of theft or other diversion to illegal use. The Study Group will focus on taggant technology currently in use in commercial explosives, and new technologies developed or proposed, such as the Isotag, since the 1980 OTA Report. All currently identified and proposed technologies will be considered, but the evaluation, research, and development of these technologies may continue for an as yet undetermined period of time.

As a further way of focusing its efforts the Study Group, through its research and through its contract with NAS, will use the Swiss experience as a departure point. While the quantities of explosives manufactured are much smaller in Switzerland than the United States and the manufacturing and handling techniques differ, the Swiss program can be viewed as an effective point of reference. The Swiss have been tagging dynamites, slurries, and water gels for 16 years. The Swiss also tag commercially manufactured ANFO and plastic explosives which to date have notbeen a significant problem in U.S. bombings. However, because the Swiss do not conduct underground mining, they neither manufacture nor tag explosive products known as permissibles in the United States. Permissibles include dynamites, slurries, water gels, and emulsions that have salts added to them to reduce the intensity of flame resulting from the explosion. Very limited compatibility testing has been conducted on permissibles. The Study Group will focus on the differences between the Swiss and U.S. explosives industries, including the absence of permissibles, and attempt to determine whether those differences will adversely affect the safety, utility and cost of taggants in the United States. The Study Group will also examine why, even after 16 years, taggants are recovered in only 22 percent of Swiss bombings and whether there are measures that could be taken in a U.S. taggant program to improve that performance.

A-2. Detection Taggants

Detection taggants could also be of greater utility to law enforcement and public safety. In fact, an even stronger case for their utility might be made since they have the potential to prevent bombings before they occur. Moreover, there is existing technology in wide-spread use for placing detection taggants or markers in plastic explosives. The Study Group will focus its future work on whether it is possible to place the same or similar markers into the most common types of commercial explosives (other than black and smokeless powders) that are involved in U.S. bombings: slurries, emulsions, and water gels. No further study of detection taggants in nitroglycerin-based dynamite will be conducted because it already emits a readily detectable vapor.

B. FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF RENDERING COMMON CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS INERT

The more than 20 years of experience of the British, the IFDC study, and the Study Groups discussions with the fertilizer manufacturers suggest that there is no current way to render AN inert and still have it function as a cost-effective fertilizer. While the Study Group has received several proposals that purport to render fertilizer inert and is aware of several ongoing research projects in this area, any solutions to this problem are likely to be a number of years in the future. Therefore, as discussed below, the primary focus of the study in the future will be on the utility and feasibility of voluntary or mandatory controls.

The Study Groups review to date of other common chemicals raises similar concerns. These common chemicals are fundamental to hundreds of industries. For example, elemental sulfur is used in the manufacture of insecticides, dyes,medicines, and synthetic and natural rubber. Based upon the Study Groups work to date, there appears to be no known way to render these common chemicals inert and have them retain their intended properties. Accordingly, as with ammonium nitrate, the study will focus on the feasibility and practicability of instituting voluntary or mandatory controls on certain common chemicals.

C. FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF IMPOSING CONTROLS ON CERTAIN PRECURSOR CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

Because many chemicals have widespread non-explosive uses, it does not currently appear to be feasible to impose voluntary or mandatory controls on all precursor chemicals. Therefore, the Study Group will focus its efforts on those precursor chemicals that have the greatest utility in the manufacture of explosives.

D. STATE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE AND USE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES

The Study Group has assembled extensive information on State licensing requirements. Review of these requirements shows a wide variety of regulatory schemes in the various States. The focus of the Study Groups future work will be on developing model legislation to provide a uniform approach to requiring a State license or permit and the development of competency standards for "users." In addition, the Study Group will focus on the feasibility of requiring permits for users of all explosives at the Federal level and/or instituting an instant check system.

E. NEW PREVENTION (DETECTION) TECHNOLOGIES

The focus of the Study Group will be to continue to work with the TSWG and identify the most promising detection technologies available.

IV. PLANS AND METHODOLOGY FOR COMPLETING STUDY

The Study Group will take the following actions to achieve the objectives set forth in the focus section above:

A. TAGGING OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS FOR PURPOSES OF DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

·390·Commission a scientific review to identify the relevant differences in explosives manufacturing and handling techniques between Switzerland and the U. S., determine whether these differences will affect the safety and utility of taggants if they were to be included in dynamite, water gels, emulsions, and slurries in the U.S., and assess vulnerability to countermeasures. The study will also examine the compatibility of taggants with permissibles.·390

·390·Commission an environmental impact assessment to determine the effects of including taggants in dynamite, water gels, emulsions, and slurries, excluding those mixed on-site for immediate use.·390

·390·Commission an independent study to attempt to simulate the July 1979, explosion at the Goex plant in East Camden, Arkansas, and determine whether taggants were the cause of that explosion.·390

·390·Obtain an expert analysis of the costs of including taggants in dynamite, water gels, emulsions, and slurries, excluding those mixed on-site for immediate use.·390

·390·Continue to work with the Swiss Federal Police to further review the use and recovery of taggants in bombings in Switzerland and changes that would be necessary to improve on current results within the United States regulatory environment. For example, the Study Group will continue to explore why taggants have been recovered in 22 percent of all Swiss bombings, and determine if there is a correlation between taggants recovered and prosecutions, and if taggants have had substantial investigative utility for the Swiss.·390

·390·Commission an independent study to determine whether the vapor detection taggants currently used in plastic explosives can be applied to emulsions, water gels, and slurries.·390

B. FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF RENDERING COMMON CHEMICALS USED TO MANUFACTURE EXPLOSIVES MATERIALS INERT

·390·Assemble a panel of experts to review proposals submitted to the Study Group to identify the most promising methods to render AN inert for future research and analysis.·390

·390·Coordinate with the TSWG to obtain the results of its ongoing study into various alternatives for desensitizing AN.·390

C. FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF IMPOSING CONTROLS ON CERTAIN CHEMICALS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF EXPLOSIVES MATERIALS

·390·Continue to work with the chemical industry and DEA to determine whether a program like DEAs precursor chemical watch program would be effective to control the diversion of chemicals that are used almost exclusively in the manufacture of explosives.·390

·390·Work with the chemical and explosives industries to identify ways to expand and enhance the voluntary programs for controlling access to materials that can be used to make explosives, similar to the fertilizer industrys "Be Aware for America Program."·390

D. STATE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE AND USE OF COMMERCIAL HIGH EXPLOSIVES

·390·Study the feasibility of developing model legislation to provide a uniform approach to State license and permit requirements, develop competency standards, and address the sale of less than case lots of explosives and, if appropriate, draft such legislation.·390

·390·Study the feasibility of requiring a permit for all "users" of all explosives at the Federal level or of instituting an instant criminal history background check system.·390

E. NEW PREVENTION (DETECTION) TECHNOLOGIES

·390·Conduct an international symposium to identify the latest concepts in detection taggant technology that can be used in emulsions, water gels, and slurries.·390

·390·Following the symposium, assemble a group of experts to evaluate the various proposals for detection taggants that have been submitted.·390

·390·Coordinate with TSWG to evaluate those technologies which have the greatest potential for preventing and solving acts of terrorism involving explosive devices.·390

V. SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETING STUDY

The Study Group will issue another report in 1998, and a final report as mandated by the Act within 30 days after conclusion of the Study. At that point, we expect that the action items detailed above will be completed or in stages of significant progress.

GLOSSARY

AMMONIUM NITRATE

Is classified as an oxidizer. An oxidizer is a substance that readily yields oxygen or other oxidizing substances to promote the combustion of organic matter or other fuel. Ammonium nitrate alone is not an explosive material. However, Federal explosives storage regulations require the separation of explosive magazines from nearby stores of ammonium nitrate by certain minimum distances.

ANFO

An explosive material consisting of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil.

BLACK POWDER

A deflagrating or low explosive compound of an intimate mixture of sulfur, charcoal, and an alkali nitrate (usually potassium or sodium nitrate). See LOW EXPLOSIVES.

BLASTING AGENT

Any material or mixture consisting of fuel and oxidizer intended for blasting, not otherwise defined as an explosive, provided that the finished product, as mixed for use or shipment, cannot be detonated by means of a No. 8 test blasting cap when unconfined.

BOOSTER

An explosive charge, usually a high explosive used to initiate a less sensitive explosive. A booster can be either cast, pressed, or extruded.

BULK MIX

A mass of explosive material prepared for use in bulk form without packaging.

COMMERCIAL EXPLOSIVES

Explosives designed, produced, and used for commercial or industrial applications, rather than for military purposes.

COMMON CHEMICALS

Any chemical compound or element that, as part of a physical mixture, would be necessary for that mixture to be considered an explosive mixture; or any chemical compound or element that could be classified as an oxidizer or as a readily available fuel.

A military plastic/moldable high explosive.

DEALER (FEDERAL)

Any person engaged in the business of distributing explosive materials at wholesale or retail.

DETECTION TAGGANTS

A marker or taggant placed into an explosive material that has utility before a bomb explodes.

DETECTION TAGGANTS WITH IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITIES

A marker or taggant placed into an explosive material that has both pre-blast and post-blast utility.

DETONATION

An explosive reaction that moves through an explosive material at a velocity greater than the speed of sound.

DETONATOR

Any device containing an initiating or primary explosive that is used for initiating a detonation. A detonator may not contain more that 10 g of total explosives by weight, excluding ignition or delay charges. The term includes, but is not limited to, electric blasting caps of instantaneous and delay types, blasting caps for use with safety fuses, detonating cord delay connectors, and nonelectric instantaneous and delay blasting caps which use detonating cord, shock tube, or any other replacement for electric leg wires.

DETONATING CORD

A flexible cord containing a center core of high explosive and used to initiate other explosives.

DYNAMITE

A high explosive used for blasting, consisting essentially of a mixture of, but not limited to, nitroglycerin, nitrocellulose, ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate, and carbonaceous materials.

EMULSIONS

An explosive material containing substantial amounts of oxidizers dissolved in water droplets surrounded by an immiscible fuel.

EXPLOSIVE

Any chemical compound, mixture, or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion.

EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS

This term encompasses actual and attempted explosives/incendiary bombings, stolen, and recovered explosives, hoax devices, and accidental explosions, as defined in ATFs Explosive Incidents Report.

EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

These include explosives, blasting agents, and detonators. Explosive materials includes, but is not limited to, all items in the List of Explosive Materials. (See Appendix C-1).

EXPLOTRACER TAGGANT

ExploTracer is based on synthetic granules dyed with fluorescent pigments and iron particles. To ensure that each particle has a distinctive code of its own, rare earth elements are added.

FERTILIZER

A substance used to make soil more fertile, such as ammonium nitrate.

FILLER

A type of explosive/incendiary/chemical substance which, in combination with a fusing and/or firing system, constitutes an improvised explosive device (e.g. dynamite, match heads, gasoline).

FLAMMABLE LIQUID

Combustible. A flammable material is one that is ignited easily and burns readily, i.e., gasoline, charcoal lighter fluid, diesel fuel, and paint thinners.

FUEL

Any substance that reacts with the oxygen in the air or with the oxygen yielded by an oxidizer to produce combustion.

HIGH EXPLOSIVES

Explosives which are characterized by a very high rate of reaction, high pressure development, the presence of a detonation wave in the explosive, and which can be caused to detonate by means of a blasting cap when unconfined.

HF-6 TAGGANT

HF-6 is similar to the 3M (Microtaggant) and is coded according to its several layers of color. The HF-6 taggant was developed by Swiss Blasting, and is used exclusively in its own products.

HMTD

An abbreviation for the name of the explosive hexamethylene triperoxide diamine.

IDENTIFICATION TAGGANTS

A marker or taggant placed into an explosive material that has utility after an explosion to identify the manufacturer, the date, and shift when it was manufactured. Once this type taggant is located and identified, the information it provides would allow law enforcement to trace all of the same type explosives manufactured on that specific date and shift to all of the legal purchasers.

IMPORTER

Any person engaged in the business of importing or bringing explosive materials into the United States for purposes of sale or distribution.

INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE

Commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, and commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State.

INTRASTATE

Pertaining to or existing within the boundaries of a State of residence.

ISOTAG

A readily identifiable, mass-enhanced, non-radioactive molecular marker that employs the unique chemical structure of the host product without harm to the quality of the product or the environment.

LICENSE (FEDERAL)

Required if a person is intending to engage in the business as an explosive materials manufacturer, importer, or dealer and allows a person to transport, ship, and receive explosive materials in interstate or foreign commerce.

LICENSEE

Any importer, manufacturer, or dealer licensed under the Federal explosives laws.

LOW EXPLOSIVES

Explosives which are characterized by deflagration (a rapid combustion that moves through an explosive material at a velocity less than the speed of sound).

MARKER

See Taggant.

METRIC TON

2,204.6 pounds or 1,000 kilograms.

MICROTAGGANT

Color-coded, polymer microchip consisting of ten layers including a magnetic layer and a fluorescent layer, which is intended to function as an identification taggant. The chip was developed by the 3M Company, but is now manufactured by Microtrace, Minneapolis, Minnesota, which acquired the rights to production in 1984.

NITROGEN (N)

N is one of the three primary plant nutrients, together with phosphorus (P) and potassium (K).

OTHER

For purposes of the EIR, the category of Other includes: match heads, military explosives (excluding C4 and TNT), improvised mixtures, flares, boosters, detonator cord, gases, blasting caps, PETN, RDX, HMTD, model rocket propellant, and smoke grenades.

OXIDIZER OR OXIDIZING MATERIAL

A substance, such as a nitrate, that readily yields oxygen or other oxidizing substances to stimulate the combustion of organic matter or other fuel.

PERMIT

Is required if any person intends to acquire for use explosive materials from a licensee in a State other than the State in which he/she resides, or from a foreign country, or who intends to transport explosive materials in interstate or foreign commerce.

PERMITTEE

Any person who has obtained a Federal User Permit to acquire, ship, or transport explosive materials in interstate or foreign commerce.

PERSON

Any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company.

PETN

An abbreviation for the name of the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate.

PHOTOFLASH AND FIREWORKS POWDER

An explosive material intended to produce an audible report and a flash of light when ignited, and typically containing potassium perchlorate, sulfur or antimony sulfide, and aluminum metal.

PRECURSOR CHEMICALS

Any chemical compound or element which can be subjected to a chemical reaction or series of reactions in order to synthesize the chemical compound or element into an explosive compound.

PYROTECHNIC

A chemical mixture which, upon burning, produces visible, brilliant displays, bright lights, or sounds.

RDX

An abbreviation for the name of the explosive cyclonite, hexogen, T4, cyclo-1,3,5,-trimethylene-2,4,6- trinitramine; hexahydro-1,3,5,-trinitro S-triazine.

REWORKED EXPLOSIVES

Any residual or off specification material which can be recycled within the manufacturing process.

SMOKELESS POWDER

Any of a class of explosive propellants that produce comparatively little smoke on explosion and consist mostly of gelatinized cellulose nitrates.

SPECIALTY EXPLOSIVES

Any specialty tool used for a particular purpose other than blasting, such as explosive-actuated device (jet-tappers, jet perforators), propellant-actuated power device (construction nail guns), commercial C-4, detasheet, oil well perforating guns, etc.

SLURRY

An explosive material containing substantial portions of a liquid, oxidizer, and fuel, plus a thickener.

TAGGANT

A solid, liquid, or vapor emitting substance put into an explosive material for the purposes of detection or identification. Also known as a marker or tracer element.

(For purposes of this report, "tagging" is the act of marking or adding a taggant to an explosive material.)

TNT

An abbreviation for the name of the explosive trinitrotoluene.

TON

2,000 pounds or 0.907 metric ton.

TRACER ELEMENT

See Taggant.

UNDETERMINED

For purposes of the EIR, the category of Undetermined captures incidents in which fillers could not be identified through laboratory analysis or incomplete data that was reported.

UREA AMMONIUM NITRATE (UAN)

UAN solution is a popular liquid fertilizer in the United States and other industrialized areas.

USERS

Any persons who purchase and use explosives within their State of residence and are not Federal licensees or permittees.

WATER GEL

An explosive material containing substantial portions of water, oxidizers, and fuel, plus a cross-linking agent which may be a high explosive or blasting agent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Atlas Powder Company

Explosives and Rock Blasting ISBN 0-9616284-0-5

Austin Powder Company

Microtaggant Compatibility with Commercial Cast Booster Explosive

Mixture, Report dated February 9, 1994